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The traditions of Hungarian legal philosophy followed the various periods of the Continental 
legal philosophical thinking until the mid-20th century. The oeuvres of the most signiﬁ cant 
legal philosophers are not restricted to the interpretation of the achievements of the more 
developed legal cultures, but are also reﬂ ected in independent theoretical efforts. In addition, 
Hungarian neo-Kantian theorists have created a number of works acknowledged 
internationally.
Among these studies, Juristische Grundlehre1 by Felix (Bódog) Somló and Rechts-
soziologie2 by Barna Horváth distinguish themselves, being frequently cited in international 
legal literature and available in renowned libraries across Europe. In addition, a number of 
other studies written by the above-mentioned authors in the German language must be 
mentioned. In addition, a number of references by European contemporaries, especially to 
Julius (Gyula) Moór’s works, appeared in publications between the two World Wars as well 
as in the years afterwards.
Somló’s monograph, ﬁ rst published in 1917, was reissued by the same publisher3 ten 
years later, due to its favourable reception and general interest, and this was then followed 
by a third reprint by Scientia Verlag in 1973.4 Horváth’s Rechtssoziologie rivals its great 
predecessor’s reputation. The monograph, published in 1934 by the aforementioned well-
known publisher, attracted the attention of scholars both in Europe and overseas. This is 
proved by the fact that the ﬁ rst part of Rechtssoziologie, complemented with other studies 
which had been published earlier in German, was republished by Buncker and Humbolt in 
1971.5 The Theory of Civil Law and Society by Ágost Pulszky, the founder of Hungarian 
legal positivism, published in London in 1888, is also to be mentioned here.6 His work, 
comprised of his university lectures, is considered the peak of his efforts to create an 
independent theory, which may be regarded as one rivalling any other contemporary 
achievement of the kind. 
These papers and their afterlives prove that there exists a segment of legal philosophical 
tradition in Hungary that is renowned even outside the country’s borders in professional 
circles. For the sake of Hungarian jurisprudence, all the signiﬁ cant achievements of 
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1 Somló, F.: Juristische Grundlehre. Leipzig, 1917. 
2 Horváth, B.: Rechtssoziologie. Probleme der Gesellschaftlehre und der Geschichtslehre des 
Rechts. Berlin, 1934. 
3 Somló, F.: Juristische Grundlehre. Leipzig, 1927.
4 Somló, F.: Juristische Grundlehre. Aalen, 1973.
5 Horváth, B.: Probleme der Rechtssoziologie. Berlin, 1971.
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international standards should be made accessible for the world. In this ﬁ eld our great 
predecessors have provided a good example through providing the world with their 
evaluations of Hungarian legal philosophical thinking.7 The evaluations had, at that time, an 
orientating effect on contemporary international scientiﬁ c attitude, and are still regarded 
worthy of consideration. For the past two decades great efforts have been made to re-
discover the traditions of Hungarian jurisprudence. A number of essays, monographs, 
volumes of studies, and reprints of the oeuvres of legal philosophers representing the major 
trends have been published, which has resulted in the revaluation of the “bourgeois” legal 
philosophy, to use the Marxist term that had been forgotten before the change of regime 
(1989/90).8 Today all of these possibilities and sources of information are available for 
those interested in legal philosophy.
Hereafter I wish to call the reader’s attention to a series of books that aims to make 
public the achievements of Hungarian legal philosophy published in foreign languages in 
the early 20th century. The title of the series is “Philosohiae Iuris”, edited by Csaba Varga, 
with its sub-series in foreign languages called “Excerpta Historica Philosophiae Hungaricae 
Iuris”, which contain essays representing perhaps the most prosperous period of Hungarian 
legal philosophy, partly as faximile reprint as well as the ﬁ rst edited publication of 
manuscripts. 
In the volumes published so far the reader can ﬁ nd essays mostly in German, but also 
in French, English and Italian, which are supplemented with short biographies, lists of 
publications, and lists of essays introducing the oeuvres, and in the end, lists of names and, 
in two cases, of legal sources. All reﬂ ect a uniﬁ ed editorial concept.9
Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie10 by Felix Somló (1873–1920), professor of Nagyvárad 
Academy of Law as well as of the Faculty of Law at Kolozsvár University, was published 
as the ﬁ rst in this series in 1999. This edition includes the essays and book reviews written 
and published between 1907 and 1914 by the professor of law, who achieved international 
fame for Hungarian legal philosophy in the early 20th century. Another point of interest of 
the book is that it contains the ﬁ rst critical reviews by Joseph Kohler, Leonidas Pitamic and 
Robert Redslob in 1917–1918, as well as a preface written by Gyula Moór in Somló’s 
Gedanken zu einer Ersten Philosophie,11 a fragmented posthumous work from 1926, which 
established his legal value principle. The volume also includes Moór’s preface to the second 
edition of Juristische Grundlehre in 1927. 
7 See Somló, F.: Die neuere ungarische Rechtsphilosophie. Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschafts-
philosophie, 1 (1907–1908) 315–323.; Horváth, B.: Die ungarische Rechtsphilosophie. Archiv für 
Rechts- und Wirtschafts philosophie, 24 (1930) 31, 37–85. 
8 See about contemporary Hungarian legal philosophical thinking In: Szabadfalvi, J: Transition 
and Tradition. Can Hungarian Traditions of Legal Philosophy Contribute to Legal Transition? 
Rechtstheorie, 33 (2002) 2–4, 167–185. [Krawietz, W.−Varga, Cs. (eds): On Different Legal Cultures, 
Premodern and Modern States, and Transition to the Rule of Law in Western and Eastern Europe. II. 
Sonderheft Ungarn.] Revaluation of Hungarian Legal Philosophical Tradition. Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie (ARSP), 89 (2003) 2, 159–170; Varga, Cs.: Philosophysing on Law in the Turmoil 
of Communist Take-over in Hungary (Two Portraits, Interwar and Post-war). In: Leszkiewicz, M. 
(ed.): The 2005 ALPSA Annual Publication of the Australian Legal Philosophy Students Associations. 
Brisbane, 2005, 82–94.
9 The volumes of this series of books are accessible on www.stephanus.hu website.
10 See Somló, F. in: Varga, Cs. (ed.): Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie. Budapest, 1999. 
11 Somló, F.: Gedanken zu einer Ersten Philosophie. Berlin−Leipzig, 1926.
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These are less known but nevertheless signiﬁ cant essays if the evaluation of an oeuvre 
is considered. While the writings in the appendix offer the evaluation of Somló’s work after 
his neo-Kantian turn, the previous studies and reviews provide an introduction to the break 
with the sociological-positivist traditions of a Julius Pikler student following Spencer, as 
well as his acceptance of the neo-Kantian paradigm. Important milestones in this process 
are his study on the new Hungarian legal philosophy of positivism (Die neuere ungarische 
Rechtsphilosophie) and his essay on the application of law (Die Anwendung des Rechts), as 
well as his lecture, reﬂ ecting his change of paradigm, which was delivered at a conference 
on legal philosophy in Germany in 1911 (Das Verhältnis von Soziologie und Rechts-
philosophie, insbesondere die Förderung der Rechtsphilosophie durch die Soziologie). The 
lecture was based on the deﬁ nition of law and the examination of the justness of law as two 
fundamental issues in the philosophy of law. The latter question is discussed in more detail 
in his study on the value standards of law (Massstäbe zur Bewertung des Rechts) published 
in 1909. In his investigation of the right law, moral values are considered as the most 
appropriate tools for evaluating law as the norm of act.
The publication of these studies provides an opportunity for those interested in gaining 
insight into the revival of Hungarian legal philosophy in the decade after the turn of the 
19th–20th centuries. The neo-Kantian philosophy being established in those years on the 
Continent surpassed the traditional theories of natural law and legal positivism as well as 
the historical view. Jurisprudence, seeking new paths, emphasized a new approach to law 
through modern methodology and value theory, and Somló had a laudable role in this 
process. His works created a possibility to abolish the previous delay in development and to 
establish in Hungary the then leading neo-Kantian legal philosophy. This all resulted in his 
being considered the number one representative of Hungarian legal philosophy for decades. 
The essays included in this volume may help us to understand the process. Hungarian legal 
philosophy can be proud of the fact that Somló, alongside Rudolf Stammler, Gustav 
Radbruch, Hans Kelsen and Alfred Verdross, is considered to be among the great 
representatives of the European neo-Kantian philosophy of law. 
The second volume of the series, published in 2002, is devoted to Abriss eines 
realistischen rechtsphilosophischen Systems12 written by István Losonczy (1908–1980), a 
reserved, rather eccentric ﬁ gure of legal philosophy in Hungary, who had comprehensive 
knowledge of not only jurisprudence but of natural and medical sciences as well. Besides 
the “realistic” legal philosophy promised in the title, the book also contains, in the appendix, 
a study published in a professional journal. Losonczy wrote this study upon Alfred Verdross’ 
request at the turn of 1948–1949 to be published in Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht, however, it was not issued due to the socio-political changes at that time. 
This study was originally published under the title Über die Möglichkeit und den 
Wissenschaftscharakter der Rechtswissenschaft in 1937. Here the author discussed issues 
on jurisprudence as a ﬁ eld of science, including mainly problems of theories of existence, 
the theory of knowledge, and methodology. The editor of the series, as a former student of 
Losonczy, may have appreciated this study the most, since it allowed the young jurist’s 
philosophical oeuvre to be reconstructed starting from the 1930s.
The essays included in the volume allow insight to be gained into the attempt to surpass 
the neo-Kantian paradigm. Losonczy expressed his concept of law against Kelsen’s “pure 
12 See Losonczy, I. in: Varga, Cs. (ed.): Abriss eines realistischen rechtsphilosophischen Systems. 
Budapest, 2002. 
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theory of law”–representing a real challenge for his contemporaries. According to 
Losonczy’s theory, law is a phenomenon including logical, explicative and normative 
elements, which seems to be evident regarding jurisprudential research, originating in 
statute law. By refusing Kelsen’s dogmas, he stands for applying a complex or in other 
words a “synthetic method”, which is based on the recognition of rules that constitute law. 
In his view, “puriﬁ ed” synthetic methodological theories have already been created, among 
which he emphasizes the theories represented by Barna Horváth, Albert Irk, and Julius 
(Gyula) Moór, as well as Erik Kaufmann, Wilhelm Sauer and Alfred Verdross in the German 
scholarly literature. It is a great loss for the Hungarian philosophy of law that after 1949 
Losonczy, as well as some of his contemporaries such as József Szabó and István Bibó, or 
the few years younger Kornél Solt (Scholz), were not allowed to continue their research. 
They either had to change careers or were forced into inner exile, or, in the worst case, they 
were imprisoned. Losonczy, for the sake of Hungarian jurisprudence, was able to continue 
his activity as a criminal lawyer.
The most extensive edition was published in 2006, Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie,13 
a volume of studies by Julius (Gyula) Moór (1888–1950), professor of legal philosophy at the 
universities of Szeged and Budapest. This is a book of 500 pages in excellent faximile quality, 
comprising seventeen studies in German, two in Italian and one in French, published between 
1922 and 1943, representing his whole oeuvre in a comprehensive manner. Moór insisted on 
making his writings, in which he primarily expressed his views on the philosophy of law, 
available for the international community of scholars. In this respect, he can be regarded as 
the most internationally-aware author in the Hungarian literature of legal philosophy in the 
ﬁ rst half of the 20th century. Unfortunately, a monographic representation of his synthesis on 
legal philosophy is missing, to the great disappointment of this ﬁ eld of study.
The collected and published essays provide a retrospective overview on the work of 
the most beloved student of Somló, the number-one personality of legal philosophy in 
Hungary between the two World Wars, who was in the early 1920s rightly called by his 
famous colleague Barna Horváth the creator of the “new Hungarian philosophy of law” as 
well as its “representative man”. Moór’s philosophy of law was fundamentally determined 
by his acceptance of the neo-Kantian view, which he openly declared as a starting point in 
philosophy. However, he admitted that neo-Kantianism with its numerous trends allows 
very different philosophical conclusions to be drawn. 
His system of legal philosophy (fundamental doctrine of law, sociology of law, legal 
axiology, and methodology of jurisprudence) was characterized by a complex view on 
posing problems. It was not by chance that he considered his own view to be among 
“comprehensive philosophical views of law”, which involves an overall concern with 
“eternal” issues of jurisprudence. Moór was inspired to create a system based on the most 
signiﬁ cant literature of jurisprudence, drawing conclusions from the mistakes of previous 
doctrines, and exempt from one-sided extremes.
Moór was from the beginnings of his career an advocate of neo-Kantian philosophy 
who, considering the distinction between reality and value to be fundamental, attempted to 
settle the relationship between these two spheres. A cornerstone of his reasoning was his 
doctrine on the dual character of law, which emphasized duality between reality and value 
in law. In his view, law is a complex phenomenon composed of elements belonging either 
to the world of existence or to that of values. This concept was ﬁ rst described in the starting 
13 See Moór, J. in: Varga, Cs. (ed.): Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie. Budapest, 2006. 
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study of the volume titled Macht, Recht, Moral (1922), which is at the same time a brilliant 
summary of his basic doctrine on law. Another study, titled Das Logische im Recht (1928), 
summarizing his fundamental views on legal dogmatics and methodology, was included in 
the volume as his leading work from the 1920s. Among the works representing the 1930s, a 
study Reine Rechtslehre, Naturrecht und Rechtspositivizmus (1931) published in “Kelsen-
Festschrift” can be read, which provides interpretation and criticism on the most signiﬁ cant 
system of legal theory of the 20th century. Furthermore, Reine Rechtslehre: Randbemerkungen 
zum neuesten Werk Kelsens (1935) is to be mentioned as the ﬁ rst evaluation of Kelsen’s 
synopsis14 in Hungary, in which Moór expressed his opinion as a contemporary of equal 
standing to Kelsen, professor in Vienna.
As part of the notional analysis of law, Recht und Gewohnheitsreicht (1934) discussing 
the issue of common law is also included in the volume, as well as the following studies: 
Das Wesen der Philosophie nach Pauler (1936) on the issues of the philosophy of science, 
Creazione e applicazione del diritto (1934), discussing the problems of creating and 
applying law, and Öffentliches und privates Recht (1938) and Das Rechtssystem (1939) 
discussing his special point of view on the system of law. Das Problem des Naturrechts 
(1935), one of the works of key importance in that decade, is a summary of Moór’s 
“negative or limitative natural law”. In his study, similarly to most contemporary Hungarian 
neo-Kantian philosophers of law, he expressed his opposition to Kelsen’s view, which 
attempted to simplify reality, as well as to the extremes of legal positivism.
The ﬁ rst study in the series from the 1940s is Der Wissenschafts-Charakter der 
Jurisprudenz (1940) discussing issues of theory and methodology of science, followed by a 
study on the problems of legal loopholes, titled Sulla questione delle lacune nel diritto 
(1941). Recht und Gesellschaft (1942) discussed causal connections in detail. The closing 
study in the volume, Was ist Rechtsphilosophie? (1943) is Moór’s last comprehensive work 
written in German, which might as well be considered as a ﬁ nal synopsis of his legal 
philosophical views. In Moór’s view pointing towards a synthesis, a decisive turn occurred 
during the 1930s and in the early 1940s, and a synthesis of characteristic changes appeared, 
mainly in the philosophical basis of his philosophy of law. This new kind of view represented 
a new trend, which had developed from a synthesis of neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian views, 
whose legal philosophical consequences were not subsequently elaborated in detail.
This brief overview does not provide the opportunity to describe and emphasize the 
importance of each study written by Moór. Nevertheless, it seems a pity that the volume only 
includes a short resume of two important studies [Metaphysik und Rechtsphilosophie (1929) 
and Soziologie und Rechtsphilosophie (1934)]. Mainly this latter study could have represented 
the progress that had occurred in Moór’s oeuvre resulting in his describing law as a 
phenomenon in the empire of “valuable reality”. In spite of all this, the volume represents this 
diverse life’s work in a sufﬁ cient way. The author of the review aims to call the attention of 
the reader to another issue which with Moór was concerned in the 1920s, namely the problem 
of paciﬁ sm and anarchy. He published a book and a study in this topic in German.15
14 Kelsen, H.: Reine Rechtslehre. Leipzig−Wien, 1934.
15 Moór, J.: Zum ewigen Frieden. Grundriss einer Philosophie des Paziﬁ smus und des 
Anarchismus. Leipzig, 1930; Das Wesen des Paziﬁ smus und die darin enthaltenen ethischen, logischen 
und soziologischen Probleme. In: Studi Filosoﬁ co-Giuridici dedicati a Giorgo del Vecchio bel XXV 
anno di insegnamento (1904–1929). II. Società Tipograﬁ ca Modenese, Antica Tipograﬁ ca Soliani, 
Modena, 1931, 146–159. 
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A unique piece in the series is the volume The Bases of Law / A jog alapjai16 by Barna 
Horváth (1896–1973), professor of philosophy of law at Szeged and Kolozsvár universities. 
A point of interest in this publication is that although it was originally written in English 
around 1947–1948, it is also available in Hungarian translation. A brief biography and a list 
of references in English are supplemented with two further studies by István H. Szilágyi, 
who has long been concerned with Horváth’s oeuvre. These essays give an insight into the 
author’s career and also provide information on the mutual intellectual inﬂ uence of Horváth 
and István Bibó, his former student. The published manuscript bears a further point of 
interest in that an important element concerning the oeuvre was focused on through giving 
an answer to the question of how Horváth reconsidered his system of the theory of law 
prior to his emigration at the end of 1949.
The originality of Horváth’s legal philosophy, which he preferred to call “pure legal 
sociology”, considering Kelsen’s terminology, lies in his synoptic attitude and the closely 
related processual legal view, which was discussed in detail in his Rechtssoziologie of 1934 
and in A jogelmélet vázlata (Outlines of legal theory),17 published three years later. The 
originality of the theory is included in harmonizing two paradigms that were in contradiction 
within the contemporary legal philosophy. The parallel effectiveness of the continental neo-
Kantian view and the pragmatic-empirical attitude of Anglo-Saxon origin proved to be a 
pioneering idea not only in Hungarian but in European legal thought as well. Horváth, 
through applying the synoptic method, provides a completely original interpretation of one 
of the fundamental issues of neo-Kantian legal philosophy, namely the relationship between 
value and reality. He evolved his method from the essence of the activity of lawyers and 
modelled it as the scheme of thoughts in the judge’s head. The processual view, connected 
to the synoptic one, claims that law is not simply a norm but a theoretical norm of behaviour 
and the related actual behaviour, which is nothing else but the procedure. A continuous co-
ordination (of synoptic character) between a legal case and the legal norm creates the 
procedural process. The signiﬁ cance of Horváth’s oeuvre lies in the fact that he created new 
perspectives for further development in the national legal theory through combining the 
familiar German-Austrian ties with views on jurisprudence in the English-speaking world.
The novelty of the recently published volume lies in the fact that Horváth, possibly 
thinking of emigration, chose the English language to summarize (practically word for 
word, as István H. Szilágyi pointed out) the view that he had elaborated a decade earlier. At 
the same time he reacted to the critical remarks included in István Bibó’s–his former student 
and by that time colleague–Zwang, Recht, Freiheit (1935). However, it is problematic why 
only a decade later he, an author completing research in the history of theory, sociology and 
the history of law, considered a return to legal theoretical roots an issue of great importance. 
After his emigration two dozen reviews and articles were published, mostly in English. The 
period of more than two decades that he spent in the USA brought about only one important 
paper in English, published in Australia, which revealed his attempt to think over the 
synoptic method. This work resulted in high professional interest and international 
discussion and aimed to describe the theory of “law ﬁ eld” in law. The underlying idea of 
this view was a change in the concept of the physical world due to the ﬁ ndings of modern 
physicists (Einstein and Maxwell). The theory of law ﬁ eld is not an elaborated view, it is 
16 See Horváth, B. in: Varga, Cs. (ed.): A jog alapjai (The Base of Law). Budapest, 2006. 
17 Horváth, B.: A jogelmélet vázlata (Outlines of Legal Theory). Szeged, 1937.
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rather an exciting theoretical experiment worth reconsidering.18 In addition to this, in the 
1950s he began to translate into English his monograph Angol jogelmélet (English legal 
theory),19 which was published in Hungarian in 1943, but was unable to complete it. The 
only professional recognition for him was the publication of the previously mentioned 
Probleme der Rechtssoziologie.
It deserves a mention that Horváth’s other studies written in foreign languages are to 
be issued in the near future as part of this series. The three volumes will include writings by 
Horváth on processual legal theory, the theory of justness and studies published during his 
years abroad, written mostly in German and English.20 These further volumes will make 
available the entire works of Horváth published in foreign languages.
Finally, the volume Die Schule von Szeged completes the series.21 The subtitle 
(Rechtsphilosophische Aufsatze von István Bibó, József Szabó und Tibor Vas) aims to inform 
the less-informed reader on those authors whose legal philosophical studies are included in 
the book. Even today we know little about the “School of Szeged”, a community composed 
of former students of Horváth.22 Nevertheless, even if it cannot be compared to the “new 
Austrian school” marked by Hans Kelsen, Adolf Merkl, and Alfred Verdross, which had a 
great effect on the European legal philosophical thinking after the turn of the century, still, 
as the only Hungarian school of jurisprudence, it has a considerable importance in national 
as well as in international jurisprudence.
The ﬁ rst publications by the members of the school of Szeged, approaching the world 
of law through the neo-Kantian paradigm represented by their professor, were issued from 
the mid-1930s. The ﬁ rst part of the volume includes István Bibó’s (1911–1979) legal 
philosophical studies. Under the title Zwang, Recht, Freiheit a summary in German of his 
major work on legal theory is included, which was printed in 1935 when he was a student 
of law. 23 This detailed resume clearly reﬂ ects the fact that the young legal theorist attempted 
to compose his own view even in this early work. In those years each legal philosopher 
expressed his own views. Bibó carried out this challenging undertaking with a thoroughness 
and moderation contrary to his age. According to his aim, he wished to grasp the essence of 
law in the connection between force and freedom. 
When elaborating his theory, he adapted two major categories used by Barna Horváth, 
the idea of synopsis and the term of social objectiﬁ cation. In terms of Bibó’s deﬁ nition, law 
simultaneously exercises the most objective force and performs the most objective freedom. 
This two-faced character of law is not a novelty in legal theory and a number of views have 
emerged emphasizing one or the other of its faces. According to Bibó, this kind of double 
18 See Horváth, B.: Field Law and Law Field. Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 
8 (1957), 44–81. 
19 Horváth, B.: Angol jogelmélet (English Legal Theory). Budapest, 1943.
20 Horváth, B.: Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie. I. 1926–1948: Prozessuelle Rechtslehre; II. 
1926–1948: Gerechtigkeitslehre; III. 1949–1971: Papers in Emigration. (hrsg. Csaba Varga), Budapest, 
2011 (in preparation).
21 Varga, Cs. (ed.): Die Schule von Szeged. Rechtsphilosophische Aufsätze von István Bibó, 
József Szabó und Tibor Vas. Budapest, 2006. 
22 See Szabadfalvi, J.: Bibó István és a szegedi iskola (István Bibó and the School of Szeged). 
In: Dénes, I. Z. (ed.): A szabadság kis körei. Tanulmányok Bibó István életművéről (Small Circles of 
Liberty. Studies on the Life-Work of István Bibó). Budapest, 1999. 125–152.
23 Bibó, I.: Kényszer, jog, szabadság (Zwang, Rechts, Freiheit). Acta Litterarum ac Scientiarum 
Reg. Universitatis Hung. Francisco-Josephinae. Sectio: Juridico-Politica, Tom. VIII. Szeged, 1935. 
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tension will provide the real strength of law as objectiﬁ cation. In concluding this study, 
József Szabó’s contemporary review published in German is included, which is a credit to 
the editor. Szabó, as a contemporary in close connection with Bibó, called the attention of 
the public opinion to this early achievement of the school of Szeged in a signiﬁ cant legal 
journal in the year of publication.
Furthermore, two complete studies by Bibó–originally written in French and German–
are included, which provide a thorough analysis on certain minor problems of legal 
philosophy. It is not by chance that all this is expressed as criticism of the great theory with 
respect to Kelsen’s theory. A study Le dogme “bellum justum” et la théorie de l’infaillibilité 
juridique (1936) is a critical paper of Kelsen’s pure theory of law. In this paper Bibó gives 
an immanent judgement on the debate-inspiring study, which had been published two years 
earlier. He is concerned with the infallibility of law, with the problems of obligation, 
awareness of international law, those of sanctioning acts and with the normative character 
of Kelsen’s method. 
In his paper Rechtskraft, rechtliche Unfehlbarket, Souveränität (1937) the author 
discusses his view regarding legal force, infallibility and sovereignty, through a different 
method from the pure theory of law, on the infallibility of law and other related issues. The 
paradigm of neo-Kantian philosophy is again considered, namely the problem of dualism of 
“Sein” and “Sollen” and its capability to be transmitted. Bibó seems to be sceptical of the 
views emphasizing a complete separation of the two spheres and he stands for the feasibility 
of Horváth’s synoptic approach. 
The second part of the volume is composed of two papers by József Szabó (1909–
1992) and a short summary in German of a study in written in Hungarian. This study is 
titled Ort und Stelle der Rechtswissenschaft in dem menschlichen Denken (1942), which is 
an explanation for a wider audience of his new-realistic (“neurealistischen”) view being 
formed at that time. We can read, as one of his complete studies, Wahrheit, Wert und Symbol 
im Rechte (1943), which was issued, along with the studies of Moór and Horváth, in the 
“Ungarn-Heft” of Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie discussing contemporary 
Hungarian legal philosophy.24  The main aim of this study was to summarize the theses on 
jurisprudence previously elaborated only in Hungarian. According to Szabó, a number of 
neo-Kantian theories emerging from the duality of existence and validity attempted to ﬁ nd a 
connection between these two spheres of the world in highly different ways. The reason 
that most attempts were unsuccessful may lie in the fact that existence and validity are not 
to be found in the objective world but in the subjective one. 
Szabó claims, based on the views of theory of knowledge referring back to Hume, that 
the world of human subjectivity is one where existence and validity, object and norm have a 
differentiating sense. The deepest roots of law are to be sought in human subjectivity. This 
idea allows him to trace back the validity basis of law to moral considerations in human 
consciousness. Psychological considerations play, not by chance, an important role in his 
theory, as well as the fundamental idea that the world of law is to regarded as a symbol or a 
system of symbols. The task of jurisprudence is to ﬁ nd the meaning behind symbols. The 
24 József Szabó applied the term “new-realistic” to describe his concept of law in the title of a 
paper published in 1948. See Szabó, J.: Der Rechtsbegriff in einer neurealistischen Beleuchtung. 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffenliches Recht, 1 (1948) 3, 291–311. (A point of interest in the paper 
is that it is word by word equal to his study “Wahrheit, Wert und Symbol im Rechte” published ﬁ ve 
years earlier.)
81FROM ORIGINAL SOURCES–NEO-KANTIAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHICAL THINKING
paper goes into detail about the connection between formalism and justness. Perhaps the 
most signiﬁ cant feature of Szabó’s new-realistic theory is the fact that he could ﬁ nd answers 
to questions of neo-Kantian philosophy due to his knowledge of philosophy and 
jurisprudence of the English-speaking countries, which had been inspired by his one-time 
schoolmaster. Thus in Szabó’s theory the views of two great legal cultures are in creative 
inter-connection. Unfortunately, the author did not have the chance to further elaborate his 
theory.
The second Szabó paper was originally published in 1974. From Chaos to the Rule of 
Law, containing his earlier views on jurisprudence, was published in a Festschrift in honour 
of René Maric. It is to Szabó’s merit that, despite his scientiﬁ c isolation, he was up-to-date 
in following with attention the international literature in the ﬁ eld, which is reﬂ ected in the 
references.
In the ﬁ nal part of the book, Die Bedeutung der transzendentalen Logik in der 
Rechtsphilosophie (1935), a work by Tibor Vas (1911–1983)–a former fellow student and 
friend of Bibó–published by his alma mater is included, which is followed by a review 
written by József Szabó. Vas in his paper is concerned with the importance of transcendental 
logics in legal philosophy; nevertheless, he includes his critical remarks as well. In the ﬁ rst 
part he introduces in detail the Kantian origins of transcendental logic and its progress in 
neo-Kantian philosophy, including the efforts by the schools of Marburg and Baden. In the 
second part the application of the transcendental method is examined through the views of 
the three most signiﬁ cant representatives of neo-Kantian legal philosophy (Stammler, 
Kelsen and Somló). The author provides criticism regarding all three theories and proves 
how the terms applied as prerequisites of general validity in law can lead to the application 
of meta-legal terms of natural law. The methods of jurisprudence will help to solve this 
problem of considering not only one but two objects of knowledge in law and denying the 
possibility of a uniﬁ ed knowledge of law; consequently they do not apply a constitutive 
method but a reﬂ ective one. Among the views that are considered as modern in surpassing 
the transcendental method, he emphasizes Horváth’s synoptic view and Gurvitch’s ideal-
realistic method, which consider the dual-objectivity of law. Vas seems to be very consistent 
in undermining the illusory conviction in the transcendental approach. All this allows him 
to seriously criticize the neo-Kantian philosophy of law. 
Having brieﬂ y introduced the current volumes, the author has no other task than to 
express his wish that the volumes published so far and the ones being or planned to be 
published will achieve the editor’s goal, the international re-discovery of Hungarian legal 
philosophy. It is the future responsibility of book distributors that this series of publications 
should become available for their target audience. 25 
25 The ﬁ rst review on the ﬁ rst volume of the series: Funke, A.: Die Deﬁ nition des Rechts und 
die Brille auf der Nase der Juristen. Rechtstheorie, 36 (2005) 4, 427–433.
